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Executive summary 
 
Through this master thesis I have done a critical review of the peak oil phenomenon. My 
analysis indicates that the production profiles for several countries seem to follow the Hubbert 
curve, but at the same time the methodology does not give reliable predictions. That means 
that the Hubbert curve seems better suited to explain the past, rather than predict the future.   
My further discussion revealed large uncertainties regarding the size of the ultimate resource 
base, and how long we can expect it to last. It is also an open question whether or not peak oil 
will occur as a result of geological factors, or if it will arise as a result of other above ground 
factors. In this context, the thesis found that lack of investments, politics and lapse of demand 
can all, or in combinations, cause peak oil.   
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Preface 
 
I have looked forward to write my master thesis for a long time. It is a unique opportunity to use a 
semester to look into something which interests me. I developed my interest for future energy supply 
during my bachelor at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH). 
During my master degree this interest increased, something which made the choice of theme for my 
thesis simple. In this master thesis I will look into to the phenomenon of peak oil, using acknowledged 
literature trying to contribute to the understanding of the future energy situation.  
The work has given me a unique possibility to learn more about the future of oil production. It has 
periodically been challenging, but also very interesting. There is no doubt that I have had steep 
learning curve. When this process started, I was convinced that there is nothing in the peak oil 
arguments. But through this work, I have realized that the problem is much more complex then what I 
first thought. Today, my understanding is much broader, and it is clear that multiple factors are 
affecting the outcome of the future supply of energy. I now look at the peak oil debate with brand new 
glasses.  
It has been a challenge to identify relevant literature. In my view the debate is partly dominated by 
people and groups that cannot be assumed to be serious contributors to the debate. Instead they are 
using peak oil as an argument to promote and support other statements and interests, often political. 
Therefore, I have decided to build my thesis on books and articles written by authors renowned for 
their opinions in both the peak oil- and the non peak oil community. 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Rögnvaldur Hannesson. The collaboration has been 
excellent. He has given me enthralling guidance in addition to quick and constructive response to all 
my questions. This has undoubtedly contributed to both my thesis and my personal interest for the 
theme. Professor Hannesson has also been helpful recommending relevant literature. I would also like 
to thank Øyvind Våge Nilsen in The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy for help to find further 
relevant literature. Last but not least, I would like to thank my cohabitant, Inger Anne Halrynjo. She 
has been a good supporter and has through many intense debates tested the strength of my arguments. 
Such discussions have obviously been valuable. Although contributions from others, I am in the 
opinion that I have worked independently with the thesis, and that I have worked my way towards the 
finished product myself. 
 
Nils Petter Fosse Bere 
Oslo, June 2010 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Based on the text, ”A critical review of the peak oil phenomenon”, I will like to take a closer 
look behind the peak oil debate. The recent high oil prices have again brought life to the peak 
oil debate, putting emphasis on how important oil is in the modern economy. There is no 
doubt that oil has contributed to develop the world we know today, and one can argue that 
cheap oil has been a very important driver to the enormous economical growth we have seen 
the last hundred years. Since oil is a non-renewable resource, it gives rise to a concern about 
what happens when all the conventional oil has been spent. A fast increasing oil price is not a 
new phenomenon. The historical price level of crude oil is illustrated in figure 1. The crude 
prices are reproduced in appendix E. 
 
Figure 1:  Historical crude oil prices 1861-2008  
 
Source: Illustration based on data from BP Statistical Review (2009). 
 
As the figure illustrates, the real price of oil had falling trend throughout the first century of 
production. It was not until the price shocks in the 1970s that the oil price started to increase. 
The 1970s is a good case study when trying to understand the world’s dependence on oil. The 
collocation in price and demand is illustrated in figure 2. 
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Figure 2:  Collocation in price and demand 1969-2008 
 1969 - 1983: Price is calculated using average Arabian Light posted at Ras Tanura. 
1984 - 2008: Price is calculated using yearly average nominal Brent Dated. 
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of Energy (2009) 
 
The 1970s showed that even if there was a rapid increase in the oil price, the world demand 
continued to grow. In 1969, the last year of relatively cheap oil, the price of oil was about 
1.80 US dollars per barrel and the world demand was about 42 million barrels a day (BP 
Statistical Review, 2009). According to Simmons (2005), many experts at the time argued 
that the price was excessive. But still, the oil price rose steadily from 1969 until 1973. From 
October 1973, there was a rapid increase in oil price due to the oil embargo carried out by 
OPEC as a result of the Yom Kippur war. The embargo made the oil price stabilize at a price 
level of 10 to 15 US dollars per barrel. In 1978 the oil price was 14 US dollars. Within the 
same timeframe (1969 – 1978), the global oil demand increased from 42 to 63 million barrels 
per day. Even if the price increased almost 8 times, the demand for oil increased with 50 
percent. These data illustrates how important the oil is, and how little a change in price level 
influence demand. It indicates that the demand is inelastic on short term basis. 
It was not until the Iranian revolution started in 1979, and the oil price increased to 31 US 
dollars per barrel, that the demand stared to decline. The collocation between price and 
demand is illustrated in figure 2. The oil price stayed relatively high from 1979 to 1985, and 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
100000
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
P
ri
ce
 (
U
S 
$
)
D
e
m
an
d
 (
th
o
u
sa
n
d
 b
ar
re
ls
 d
ai
ly
)
Demand US $ money of the day US $ 2008
7 
 
demand was falling throughout that period. Looking at the period from 1974 to 1985, we see 
that the demand almost stagnated. This illustrates how the demand is affected by changing 
price level on longer terms. In other words, it indicates that the demand is more elastic over 
time.   
The oil price stabilized in the 1980s and 1990s, but during the last few years the oil price have 
multiplied reaching an average price of 97 US dollars in 2008. In July 2008, the crude price 
almost reached 150 dollars per barrel. The demand has increased gradually since 1985. 
Using this example on today’s energy situation, the recent high oil price may be a result of 
inelastic demand, meaning that a huge change in price does not influence the demand to a 
great extent. In a future situation with restricted supply, the price may reach very high levels. 
Both Fattouh (2010) and Maass (2005) stress how the combination between the inelastic 
demand for oil and the lately narrowed gap between demand and supply gives little possibility 
to act when it comes to stabilize shocks in the market. If the recent high oil price is due to lack 
of spare capacity, it may indicate that the suppliers are struggling getting enough oil to the 
market, something which can be interpreted as a warning of peak oil being close in time.  
Today’s situation is quite different from the situation in the 1970s and 1980s. When OPEC 
reduced their production in the 1970s, new oil provinces like the North Sea and the Gulf of 
Mexico was ready to compensate for the reduced OPEC production. At the same time, the 
developed world faced an economic stagnation, something which reduced the demand for oil. 
Today, the situation is different. Firstly, there are no obvious new provinces ready to 
compensate for falling oil production in other provinces. Secondly, there is a very high 
economic growth in some large developing countries which require oil. I will take a closer 
look at this in chapter 5. 
When it comes to my thesis main topic, peak oil, it is general agreement to the fact that oil as 
a non-renewable resource one day will be exhausted, at least in an economic sense. But just 
saying that an exhaustible resource will be exhausted does not add anything to the debate. It is 
rather the deduction of a self-evident truth. It is worthless to predict the future by saying that 
an exhaustible resource will eventually be exhausted and its production will decline until 
extinction after reaching a peak. Such statements are under certain conditions just a tautology. 
In my view, the interesting debate includes the questions of what happens when the peak is 
reached, what will cause the peak, and when will it happen. At that time the production 
capacity has reached its maximum, and cannot continue to grow, something which implies 
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that either or both the demand and supply has to adjust to a new reality. With a world that 
demands more and more energy, this may be a serious challenge for future generations.  
 
Based on the above text, I will like to divide the task of this thesis into three different 
subtasks, which can be summarized as:  
  
 
 Do production paths follow the Hubbert curve? 
 How large is the world’s ultimate resource base? 
 Can other factors, not related the Hubbert methodology, cause peak oil? 
 
 
To answer these three subtasks, I have chosen to split the rest of the thesis into four chapters. 
In the first part, chapter 2 and 3, I will present the phenomenon of peak oil, and give a 
theoretical approach towards it. In chapter 3 I will analyze the Hubbert methodology in two 
different ways. Firstly, I will analyze how the Hubbert curve correlates with historical 
production data. Secondly, I will test the reliability of the Hubbert predictions. In the second 
part, chapter 4, I will look deeper into the most fundamental assumption behind the peak oil 
theory, which is the total amount of oil in the world, referred to as the ultimate resource base. 
Further, I will use the third part, chapter 5, to go closer into other factors influencing the 
future of oil, and discuss how non-geological factors may be of vital importance when it 
comes to the presence of a production peak.  
 
2.0 The phenomenon of peak oil 
 
As mentioned before, this chapter will introduce the phenomenon of peak oil, which is the 
time when the global rate of crude oil extraction reaches its maximum rate, and then starts to 
decline. The chapter will also give a theoretical approach towards it. 
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2.1 Introduction to peak oil 
 
There is a fundamental concept surrounding the debate of peak oil production which is often 
misunderstood. This is the use of the word peaking, which does not mean that the world is 
running out of oil, but is rather a concept of reaching a maximum production level.  
According to the NPC Global Oil & Gas Study (2007), the essence in the peak oil debate is 
simple. There is a finite amount of oil in the world, something which implies that an 
everlasting growth in production and consumption is not sustainable. The idea is that 
geological scarcity at some point will make it impossible for global petroleum production to 
avoid falling, heralding the end of the oil age.  
The world’s oil resources can be divided into reservoirs and wells. There are only so many 
wells required to efficiently extract oil from each reservoir. The production profile is given by 
the sum of many individual wells or reservoirs, added together to one production profile 
(Hannesson, 1998). An individual reservoir typically follows the specific path, illustrated in 
figure 3. 
 
Figure 3:  Typical production phases for a petroleum reservoir. 
 
Source: Replication of Hannesson (1998), page 63. 
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The typical production path in figure 3 can be divided in three different phases. The first 
phase consists of a period with increased production rate. The increasing production rate 
comes from a growing number of production wells being drilled. When the optimal numbers 
of production wells have been drilled, the reservoir will reach its maximum production and 
eventually maintain at a production plateau in phase 2. When extracting oil, the pressure 
within the well starts to decline as more and more oil is extracted. Several methods can be 
used to maintain a certain level of production, but sooner or later, the production from the 
well will reach phase 3 and start to decline. In phase 3 the declining production will continue 
until the cost of extraction exceeds the value of the product sold. Thus, no reservoir has ever 
been pumped dry.  
Since reservoirs will be exhausted at different times, the sum of them will not shape a 
production path equal to each individual path. As the industry in the area or country develops, 
more and more reservoirs are producing at the same time, something which gives an 
increasing total production. But since oil is a non-renewable resource, the resource is getting 
exhausted, making it more and more difficult to find new and economically feasible projects. 
At a given point, the production within the area will start to decline. The sum of many 
different individual wells gives us a bell-shaped production path, which is illustrated in the 
following figure:  
 
Figure 4:  The relationship between individual reservoirs and total production. 
 
Source: Replication of Hannesson (2008). 
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It is difficult to determine the global production profile. Firstly, there is a lack of reliable data, 
including both known and unknown resources. Secondly, other factors have to be taken into 
consideration, for instance economic, political and technological factors. Since the production 
relies on multiple factors the predictions are hard to estimate. I will discuss the most 
important factors closely in chapter 4 and 5. 
Since most economic models of exhaustible resources do not explicitly generate a peak in 
production, they do not give additional insight into the peak oil phenomenon. One example is 
the classic Hotelling framework, which predicts the net prices to grow at a rate equal to the 
interest rate. According to Holland (2006), even if extensions are done on the classic 
Hotelling model, including uncertainty, limited capacity, set-up cost, increasing cost with 
cumulative extraction, and different grades of ore, the model does not predict a peak in 
production. This raises the question whether an observed peak ever could have been predicted 
by using an economic model, or if production peak is an example of a market failure or 
disequilibrium.    
 
2.1.1 Two different views on peak oil 
 
The debate of peak oil is dominated by two different polarized groups. One side consists of 
the peak oil community, or peakist. This group of people argues that geological scarcity will 
make it impossible for global petroleum production to avoid falling, and that it will start 
happening in the near future, heralding the end of the oil age. They predict that the production 
rate will drop rapidly after the peak is reach, something which will cause a potential economic 
catastrophe. Thus, they emphasis an urgent need of developing both foreign and domestic 
policies to address economic implications associated with post-peak decline in global oil 
production.  
The other side is the non-peak oil community. This group consists of people who do believe 
that the oil production will continue to grow for many decades to come. They acknowledge 
the fact that oil is a nonrenewable resource, something which implies that the consumption of 
oil cannot grow forever. Thus, there has to be some kind of a future peak in oil production. 
But, they also believe that the resource base is sufficient to sustain an increasing rate of 
production for many years to come. Further, this group also differs from the peak oil 
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community regarding their expectations of what will cause the peak, and in their expectations 
regarding what will happen when the peak is reached. In contrast to the peak oil community, 
the non-peak oil community argues that the production rate will not drop rapidly after the 
peak is reach. Instead, they argue that the production will stabilize at a plateau, or at least fall 
more slowly than the peak oil community predicts. As this thesis will illustrate, the outcome 
of the prospects depends heavily on the assumptions made.   
 
2.1.2 Definitions 
 
Before I present some of the theoretical framework behind the idea of peak oil, I would like to 
stress the importance of definitions and how they influence the outcome of the debate. The 
definitions mentioned in this chapter are summarized in table 1.  
The debate depends heavily on the definitions of the resource base. By this I mean what to 
include in the base, since there are several categories of oil. Each of the categories has 
different costs, depletion profiles and characteristics. While some of the categories are easy, 
fast and cheap to produce, others are the opposite. In this context, terms like conventional and 
unconventional are widely used. According to World Energy Council (WEC, 2007), there are 
no standard definitions of the terms, something which leads to confusion. In this thesis, I will 
define the term conventional to include oil extracted by the use of traditional well method. 
The term unconventional is defined as oil extracted by the use of non-traditional methods, 
including extra-heavy oil, bitumen, shale-oil and oil from coal.  
There is also confusion connected to the use of the terms reserves and resources. While 
reserves are the amount of oil which are currently economically and technologically 
recoverable, resources are the quantities that cannot be recovered economically and 
technologically today, but may be so in the future. According to Odell (2004), to be classified 
as a resource, two basic conditions need to be satisfied. Firstly, there has to exist knowledge 
and skills to allow for both extraction and use. Secondly, there has to be a demand for the 
resource. We cannot talk about a resource if not both of these conditions are satisfied.  
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Table 1:  Summary of definitions   
Term Explanation 
Reserves The amount of oil which is currently economically and 
technologically recoverable. 
Resources The quantities that cannot be recovered economically and 
technologically today, but may be so in the future. 
Conventional  Oil extracted by the use of traditional well method. 
Unconventional Oil extracted by the use of non-traditional methods, including extra-
heavy oil, bitumen, shale-oil and oil from coal. 
 
 
2.2 The Hubbert curve – geometrical approach 
 
In this thesis I will present two different theoretical approaches towards the Hubbert curve. In 
this chapter, I will present Hubbert‟s geometrical approach, while I will present Hubbert‟s 
mathematical approach in chapter 2.3.  
People have predicted a near-future peak in the global oil supply for more than half a century, 
without being able to hit the bull’s eye with their prospects. What has given fuel to the debate 
of peak oil is the phenomenon of the Hubbert curve, or Hubbert’s Peak, named after the US 
geologist Marion King Hubbert. He used the relationship between current production and 
accumulated production to estimate that the US oil production would start to fall early in the 
1970s (Hubbert, 1956). At the time, Hubbert’s predictions were controversial, but when they 
turned out to be true, Hubbert became a legend.  
Today, Hubbert’s way of thinking and the phenomenon of peak oil are used as an argument in 
the debate of future energy sources. The idea is that if the oil production within a specific area 
does follow the Hubbert curve, then it should also be applicable on a global scale. Hubbert’s 
estimate from 1956 for the US crude oil production is shown in figure 5.  
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Figure 5:  Hubbert’s prediction for US crude oil production. 
The ultimate production is based on assumed initial reserves of 150 and 200 billion barrels. 
Source: Hubbert (1956), page 22. 
 
Hubbert’s prediction, which is presented in figure 5, was built upon the geometrical approach. 
He extrapolated the curve in the figure by making two basic considerations. Firstly, for any 
production curve for a finite resource, two points of the outset are known. This is when time 
equals zero (t=0) and when time equals infinity (t=∞). This means that we know for sure the 
production rate is zero when the time reference is zero, and the production rate will be zero 
when the resource is exhausted. Secondly, the ultimate cumulative production equals the 
shaded area in figure 6. This consideration arises from the fundamental theorem of integral 
calculus. If it exists a function 
(1)        , 
then the 
(2)        
  
 
, 
where A is the area between        and the x-axis from 0 to X1. If the production curve is 
plotted against an arithmetical scale, we can write the ordinate as  
(3)         , 
where dQ is the quantity of the resource produced over the interval dt. It is this logic Hubbert 
uses when he says that the area under the curve up to any time t is given by 
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(4)                  
 
 
 
 
    , 
where Q is the accumulated production up to time t. The ultimate production is given by  
(5)           
 
 
 
These basic mathematical relationships are illustrated in figure 6.  
 
Figure 6:  Mathematical relation between production rate and cumulative production.   
 
Source: Hubbert (1956), page 10. 
 
Based on Hubbert’s two basic considerations, he argues that the only a priori information 
needed is the magnitude of the ultimate cumulative production (Hubbert, 1956). This 
production will be less, or at most equal to, the quantity of the initial resource. If we know the 
quantity of the initial resource, we are able to draw possible production curves. The curves 
will all begin and end with a production equal to zero, and encompassing an area equal to the 
ultimate cumulative production. But, even if the geometric approach derives the logic behind 
the bell-shaped curve, it does not give any mathematical formulas on how to fit and use a 
Hubbert curve. The curve is fitted using cumulative production and requires educated guesses 
about the global ultimate reserves.  
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2.3 The Hubbert curve - mathematical approach 
 
In addition to the geometrically fitted Hubbert curve, which was presented in chapter 2.2, the 
Hubbert curve does also have a mathematical approach. Hubbert presented this approach in 
his 1982 paper (Deffeyes, 2009). The mathematical approach gives an approximation towards 
the production profile without the use of educated guesses regarding the size of the global 
ultimate reserves. As Deffeyes argues, there are reasons to believe that Hubbert probably 
reached his conclusion first, and then searched for raw data and methods to support his 
conclusion afterwards. If these assertions are right, it means that the mathematical method 
should be seen as a mathematical approximation towards the original method, which consisted 
of educated guesses regarding the size of the ultimate global reserves.  
Hubbert’s mathematical approach is built upon a logistic curve. This means that the 
production actually has to follow a logistic shaped curve. Otherwise, the methodology is 
useless. Hubbert could have used several bell-shaped curves, such as the Gaussian, Lorentz 
and the logistic curve. All these curves are quite similar, and could all have been used for a 
mathematical approach towards the peak oil phenomenon. It is an open question why Hubbert 
used a logistic model, especially since the use of a Gaussian curve actually fits the US 
production outcome best (Deffeyes, 2009).  
In Hubbert’s 1982 paper, he presented a way of making a graph which turns a logistic curve 
into a straight line. This technique is referred to as Hubbert’s linearization. An idealized graph 
is illustrated in figure 7. 
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Figure 7:  Hubbert’s linearization – idealized graph. 
 
Source: Replication of illustration Deffeyes (2009), page 153. 
 
The horizontal axis is the cumulative amount of oil produced, and the vertical axis is the oil 
production per year as a percentage of the cumulative production up to that year. As the figure 
shows, the dots fall closer together at the beginning, and at the end, when only small amounts 
of oil are produced. If the historical production data are approximately a straight line on the 
graph, then the history is well described by a logistic curve. The cross in the center marks the 
peak year of annual production. The intersection between the straight line and the horizontal 
axis gives the accumulated production when the region is finally exhausted.  
The logic behind Hubbert’s linearization can be explained by using the following simple 
linear equation: 
(6)        , 
where Y and X is respectively the vertical axis and the horizontal axis of the graph (Deffeyes, 
2005). The symbol a is a constant which gives the value of Y when X is zero. The symbol b is 
the slope of the line. When linking this simple equation (6) to Hubbert’s linearization, we 
have to make the following translation, using the symbols from figure 7. Symbol Y  becomes 
the oil production per year as a percentage of the cumulative production up to that year  
 
 
 , 
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symbol X becomes the cumulative amount of oil produced (Q), and symbol a keeps the same 
meaning. Symbol b can be calculated using the ratio 
 
  
. The negative sign is due to the 
negative slope of the curve. By doing the translation, we get equation (7). 
(7)  
 
 
      
Rewriting equation (7) gives equation (8). 
(8)           
Based on the above derivation, the annual production will evolve over time as stated by 
equation (9), which gives the relationship between the current production      and 
accumulated production    , where a and b are constants. To be able to estimate a logistic 
curve, like Hubbert did, one has to estimate the parameter values a and b in the logistic curve 
(Hannesson, 2008). To do so, one needs several years of production data. The estimation can 
be done by minimizing the sum of squares of the misfits between the historical observations 
and equation (9), or by the use of Hubbert’s linearization.  
(9)            
 , 
where:  
(10)     
  
  
 
Equation (9) and (10) gives us the equation behind the Hubbert curve, presented as a first-
order non-linear differential equation (11). 
(11)  
  
  
         
  
 
(12)  
  
  
       
   
 
  
 
(13)  
  
     
   
 
 
     
 
(14)  
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(15)   
  
 
  
  
     
      
By rewriting the equation (11) through equation (12) to (14), I can more easily solve the 
differential equation. By solving the equation, I find the Hubbert curve on a logarithmic form. 
The solution is presented in equation (16): 
(16)                       
 
(17)      
 
 
      
     
 
(18)  
  
      
       
By rewriting through equation (16) to (18), I can more easily solve for    , something which 
gives me equation (19). The term    is a constant which can be calculated when setting a 
specific reference year. The choice of reference year is important when fitting the curve 
towards the historical data: 
(19)     
  
      
 
Solving equation (18) for   gives equation (20), which is the usual way of presenting the 
logarithmic version of the Hubbert curve. By using equation (20), I can trace the yearly 
cumulated production: 
(20)     
          
       
 
       
       
 
The ultimate recoverable resource base is given when time goes to infinity, t  ∞: 
(21)         
       
       
  
 
 
    
 
Through equation 6 to 21, I have derived Hubbert’s mathematical methodology towards the 
peak oil phenomenon. By using this mathematical methodology, I will be able to make 
Hubbert curves, using only historical data as input. This can be used to make predictions 
about the future, giving us early estimates of the future production path. But, as mentioned 
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earlier in this chapter, it is important to stress that the mathematical methodology is an 
approximation towards Hubbert’s original methodology.  
 
2.4  Critics and strengths by Hubbert’s methodology 
 
Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) points out several weaknesses with 
Hubbert’s methodology (Jackson, 2006). Firstly, Hubberts initial estimates were built on a 
geometrical approach. It was much later that Hubbert developed a mathematical approach. 
Secondly, Hubberts approach predicts the production to peak when half the resource base of 
an area is depleted. This means that the production path has to be symmetrical in time, which 
implies the decline curve to be a mirror image of the of the growth curve. Even Hubbert 
himself noted that the curve did not need to be symmetrical. Thirdly, the use of Hubbert’s 
methods requires quite accurate knowledge of the size of the ultimate recoverable reserves. 
Even if Hubbert’s mathematical approach does not need data for the ultimate recoverable 
reserves, the logic behind is built upon the assumption of a known and constant ultimate 
resource base. Numerous studies have shown the fact that the estimates for most oil fields, as 
a result of improved technology, often increase over time. An example is the North Sea, 
where the proven reserves increased by 86 percent from 1985 to 2006. The model does not 
incorporate technical or economic factors which influence the production capacity. In other 
words, the model simply ignores some of the major drivers of production. The critics are also 
supported by Deffeyes (2005), who argues that the Hubbert curve relies on an underlying 
assumption that the possibility of finding oil is strongly dependent of the fraction of 
undiscovered oil and that nothing else is of major significance, including the price of oil.  
In general, most of the critics regarding Hubbert’s method rely on the fact the method is very 
simple, but the simplicity is also one of the main advantages with the model. Instead of 
having to take into account multiple factors and enormous amounts of data, the method uses 
only the historical production to make a very simple approximation to a very complex world.  
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3.0 Analysis of Hubbert’s mathematical methodology 
 
I will now use the mathematical approach, which I presented in chapter 2.3, and analyze how 
well the model fits actual historical data and how good the predictions historically have been. 
The Hubbert curves are traced by the use of equation (20).  
(20)     
          
       
 
       
       
 
Firstly, chapter 3.1 will test how well the actual production correlates with the Hubbert curve. 
Secondly, chapter 3.2, will test whether or not the method gives reliable predictions, and try to 
give rational explanations for my findings making it a qualitative analysis. To limit the scope 
of the analysis I have chosen to take a closer look at available data for the United States (US), 
Norway and the United Kingdom (UK).  
 
3.1  The correlation between actual production and the Hubbert curve 
 
One can argue that some countries have a large enough production to influence the world 
market. Notwithstanding, I want to assume that each country’s supply of oil does not make 
any significant influence on the world market price. Thus, looking at only a single country, 
the demand is not of significant interest. The demand is then given by the world market, and 
nothing else, and I will not consider the change in demand when discussing each single 
country’s production. Looking at each single country, the interesting factors are the ultimate 
recoverable resource base within each country, and how the resource base tends to grow. 
 
US 
The analysis of the historical production and the US Hubbert curve is presented in figure 8. 
Looking at the figure, there should be no doubt to the fact that the US production is closely 
correlated with the Hubbert curve. Thus, the US production profile serves as an excellent 
example of the Hubbert curve. The Hubbert curve is based on data for all 50 states from 1900 
to 2008. The reference year is set to 2008, but since the historical production follows the 
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Hubbert curve closely, the choice of reference is of little importance to the outcome of the 
analysis. Production data for the US are reproduced in appendix A. 
 
Figure 8:  Historical US production and the Hubbert curve  
Year of reference is 2008. 
Hubbert curve is estimated on dataset from 1900 to 2008. 
Dataset includes all 50 states. 
 
Source: Calculations based on EIA - 1.  
 
Even though the US production profile clearly correlates with the Hubbert curve, it is 
important to note that the US production have been in decline for a long time, something 
which implies that there is not too many years’ left to predict.  
As discussed in chapter 2, Hubbert’s methodology is based on the assumption of a fixed 
resource base. One can then ask if Alaska should be included in the historical US production, 
or if it is more correct to only include data from the contiguous states, referred to as the lower 
48 states. Large oil reserves were discovered in Alaska in the 1970s, something which is a not 
consistent with the assumption of a fixed resource base. Figure 9 illustrates both Hubbert 
curves and the US production rate with and without Alaska. The Alaskan data are reproduced 
in appendix B. 
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Figure 9:  US production and the importance of Alaska 
Year of reference is 2008. 
Data for Alaskan production from 1977 to 2008. 
Data for US production from 1900 to 2008. 
 
Source: EIA – 1 and EIA – 2. 
 
As figure 8 shows, the oil production from Alaska moves the Hubbert curve outwards. This is 
not unexpected, since the Alaskan production for several years contributed for more than 20 
percent of the total US production. In 1988, the peak year for the Alaskan production, the 
contribution was over 25 percent. It is also worth mentioning that the peak year is not affected 
by the choice of dataset, but by including the Alaskan production the Hubbert curve gets a 
higher peak which is more consist with the actually historical production. But as the figure 
shows, the question whether or not to include Alaska in the dataset has little influence on the 
big picture and when the US oil production ends.  If the Alaskan production had been 
relatively larger, then we can expect the influence on the US Hubbert curve to be even larger. 
One can just imagine how the US Hubbert curve would look like if the oil discoveries in 
Alaska were equal to the Saudi Arabian reserves. 
 
Norway 
The Norwegian oil production is another good example of how the historical production 
profile follows the Hubbert curve. As figure 10 illustrates, independently of the choice of 
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reference year, the method shows that the Norwegian oil production is in fact following the 
Hubbert curve very closely. This means that the choice of reference is of little importance for 
the outcome. The estimation is based on data from 1971 to 2008, using both, 1980, 1990 and 
2000 as reference year. The Norwegian data are reproduced in appendix C. 
 
Figure 10:  Historical Norwegian production and the Hubbert curve 
  Year of reference is 1980, 1990 and 2000. 
  Hubbert curves are estimated on data from 1971 to 2008. 
 
Source: Calculations based on data from BP Statistical Review (2009). 
 
Comparing the actual Norwegian production with the estimated Hubbert curve, the estimates 
are very close to the actual production. This has mainly two reasons. Firstly, the Norwegian 
production has been kept within a limited area. This is vital for the methodology of Hubbert, 
which is based on the fact that the resource base has to be fixed. Most of the resources which 
have been added to the Norwegian resource base are mainly based on technological 
improvements and not major findings in new areas. But, we may expect that a possible future 
opening of the Lofoten and Vesterålen areas will make the Norwegian production profile shift 
outwards. This will be a breach with the underlying assumption behind the Hubbert curve, 
namely that the size of the ultimate resource base has to stay constant. Secondly, the 
Norwegian oil production is already declining. Thus, more than half of the production profile 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 (
m
ill
io
n
 t
o
n
s)
Hubbert Curve - 2000 Hubbert Curve - 1990
Hubbert Curve - 1980 Historical production
25 
 
is already known for sure, something which means that there are not many years’ lefts to 
predict.   
 
United Kingdom 
When looking at the United Kingdom’s profile in figure 11, we see that the production path 
does not correlate with the bell-shaped Hubbert curve. The model is based on historical data 
from 1965 to 2008, where 2000 is used as reference year. It is worth mentioning that the UK 
had oil production from 1965, but the production was low and did not start to increase until 
1976. The UK production profile does not follow the Hubbert curve closely, but has a rather 
rough approximation to the Hubbert curve. Production data for the UK are reproduced in 
appendix D. 
 
Figure 11: Historical UK production and the Hubbert curve. 
  Year of reference is 2000. 
  Hubbert curve is estimated on data from 1965 to 2008. 
 
Source: Calculations based on BP Statistical Review (2009).  
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The production profile has two separately peaks. This is due to the Piper Alpha accident, 
which caused a dramatic production decline between 1985 and 1989 (ASPO, 2001). The 
accident forced the government to introduce new safety standards. But if we isolate the period 
from 1965 to 1990, we can see that the Hubbert curve roughly fits the historical production. 
This is illustrated in figure 12. 
 
Figure 12:  Historical UK production and the Hubbert curve. 
 Year of reference is 1990.  
The Hubbert curve is estimated on data from 1965 to 1990. 
 
Source: Calculations based on BP Statistical Review (2009).  
 
Even if the Hubbert curve fits the UK production within a limited time frame, figure 11 and 
12 does not give much support for the Hubbert curve. The fact that political involvement at 
such extent can influence the production profile clearly illustrates how non-geological factors 
do play a vital contribution to the progress of production, shown as the two peak production 
path in figure 11. 
That fact that both Norway and the US seems to have a production profiles which follows the 
Hubbert curve, adds weight to the peak oil arguments. Even the UK production profile does 
have a disheveled bell shape. On the other hand, the historical UK production clearly 
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illustrates how political considerations influence the production rate. In addition, the US 
production illustrates how new major discoveries influence the Hubbert curve. 
 
3.2 The reliability of predictions made by the Hubbert curve 
 
To test the reliability of the predictions made by Hubbert’s logistic approach, which was 
presented in chapter 2.3, I have used the model to predict the countries’ production paths 
based on historical data which should have been available at different points in time. In that 
way, I will be able to compare the estimates made with Hubbert mathematical approach with 
the actual production outcome. Just as my analysis in chapter 3.1, the Hubbert curves are 
traced by the use of equation (20). 
(20)      
          
       
 
       
       
 
 
US 
By testing how reliable the predictions made by Hubbert’s mathematical approach are, I find 
it interesting trying to replicate the predictions made by Hubbert in 1956, when he predicted 
that the US oil production would peak in 1970. The calculations are based on the historical 
data available from 1900 to 1956, using 1956 as reference year. As discussed in chapter 3.1, 
the historical production follows the Hubbert curve so closely that the choice of reference 
year does not influence the outcome. The result is presented in figure 13. 
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Figure 13: Historical US production and a Hubbert curve based on available data in 
1956. 
Year of reference is 1956. 
The Hubbert curve is estimated on data from 1900 to 1956. 
 
Source: Calculations based on EIA – 1. 
 
As illustrated in the figure, the use of Hubbert mathematical approach does not fit well with 
the actual US production profile. Hubbert’s mathematical methodology forecasts the peak to 
be reached in 1962, with a maximum production of 2.58 thousand million barrels. Looking 
back in history, the US production reached its maximum in 1970, with a production of 3.52 
thousand million barrels This is about 36 percent higher than what should have been the 
maximum production. Taking into consideration that the predictions were done in 1956, 
which is close to the predicted peak in 1962, the predictions has to be described as poor. On 
the other hand, Deffeyes (2009) stresses that we have to remember that Hubbert did not 
develop a mathematical approach until later, and based his predictions in 1956 on a 
geometrical approach, presented in chapter 2.2. This means that my replication of Hubbert’s 
1956 prediction is not built upon the same methodology as Hubbert actually used in 1956. 
This may explain the different results. Thus, an important factor is Hubbert guesses for the 
size of the ultimate reserves. In the mathematical approach, the size of the ultimate reserves is 
estimated as the constant a divided by the constant b, cf. chapter 2.3. 
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Another important factor influencing the accuracy of Hubbert’s predictions relies on the fact 
that new major oil discoveries were done in Alaska. The super giant oilfield, Prudhoe Bay, 
was discovered in Alaska in 1968, something which expanded the US’s resource base. Even if 
Prudhoe Bay is a large oilfield, it did not ensure that the US remained the world largest oil 
producer. The importance of Alaska was discussed on chapter 3.1.  
Deffeyes (2005) stresses the question whether or not Hubbert could have predicted the US 
peak even earlier than 1956, or if Hubbert just had luck with his 1956 prediction. As figure 5 
shows, Hubbert gave his readers a choice between two different estimates. It means that even 
if Hubbert managed to hit the bull’s eye with his predictions, it was only one of the prospects 
that were right. One has to remember that giving more than one guess increase the possibility 
of hitting the target. 
Anyway, the mathematical approach does not predict the peak to come in the same year as 
Hubbert predicted in 1956.  This may not necessary be a coincidence. According to figure 14, 
it looks like it exist a trend that Hubbert’s mathematical approach predicts the peak to come in 
the near future as long as the peak is not reached. As time goes by, the predictions of the peak 
is moving into the future.  
 
Figure 14:  Evolvement in the Hubbert curve over time – US dataset. 
  Year of reference is set equal to respectively prediction years. 
 
Source: Calculations based on EIA – 1. 
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Based on my findings in figure 14, it seems like the Hubbert curve does not predict the peak 
until the peak is almost reached. The predictions of the US oil production show that the peak 
is predicted to arise about 2-6 years after the year when the predictions were made. The trend 
seems to exist as long as production is increasing. This indicates that Hubbert’s mathematical 
approach does not give reliable predictions of when a peak is to be reached, as long as the 
production is increasing. It is not until the peak is near that the Hubbert curve actually makes 
reliable prospects of the oil production.  
 
Norway 
The findings done on the US dataset are supported by similar findings in the Norwegian 
dataset. By making a Hubbert curve with the historical data available in 1980, 1990, 2000 and 
2008, I have compared the predictions made by available data in the specific years with the 
actual outcome. The results are given in the following figure: 
 
Figure 15:  Evolvement in the Hubbert curve over time – Norwegian dataset. 
  Year of reference is set equal to respectively prediction years. 
 
Source: Calculations based on data from BP Statistical Review (2009). 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 (
m
ill
io
n
 t
o
n
s)
Hubbert curve 1980
Hubbert curve 1990
Hubbert curve 2000
Hubbert curve 2008
Historical Norwegian 
production
31 
 
 
As figure 15 illustrates, the methodology developed by Hubbert does not give accurate 
predictions in the early phases of production. As seen in the US dataset, also the Norwegian 
dataset has a trend where the peak is predicted to arise a few years into the future. As we are 
getting closer to the actual peak, more data are added into the model, and the Hubbert curve 
adjusts to fit the actual outcome better. It seems like the predictions evolve over time, 
something which is not that surprising since more and more data is included in the model, 
making the model more accurate. 
 
UK 
In the same way as with the US and Norway, I will illustrate how the UK predictions based on 
Hubbert’s methodology have evolved over time. A graphical illustration of the results is 
shown in figure 16. 
 
Figure 16: Evolvement in the Hubbert curve over time – UK dataset 
  Year of reference is set equal to respectively prediction years. 
  
Source: Calculations based data from BP Statistical Review (2009). 
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the analysis of how the predictions made by the Hubbert curve have been able to hit the bull’s 
eye is not straight on. But, by taking a closer look at each of the two peaks, I will make the 
same conclusion as I did with the Norwegian and the US dataset, namely that the model needs 
so much data that we have almost reached the peak until the model is capable of predicting 
the peak fairly precisely. The use of Hubbert’s methodology does not give reliable 
predictions, thus it does not have the availability to predict when the oil production will peak.  
 
3.3 Summary 
 
Based on my analysis of the three countries in chapter 3.1, which have had declining 
production for years, I will conclude that the production rates seems to follow the Hubbert 
curve. Thus, there may be something to the theory of Hubbert. Over time, one can therefore 
expect a production path for a defined area to follow a bell-shaped curve like the Hubbert 
curve.  
My analysis in chapter 3.2 clearly reveals a weakness with the use of Hubbert’s methodology, 
since the methodology always predicts the peak to arise in near future as long as the peak is 
not reached. This may work as a reasonable explanation why the peak oil community has 
failed in predicting the peak for more than half a century, and why they always predict the 
peak to be reached with a few years. My analysis of the production, clearly illustrates my 
point that Hubbert’s method does not give reliable predictions regarding future oil 
productions.  
The various estimations evolve over time to fit the actual outcome, and its ability to predict 
when the peak is reached looks rather incidental. In many ways, as long as the peak is not 
reached, it seems like Hubbert’s method always predicts the peak to come a few years into the 
future. A reasonable explanation may be the fact that cumulative additions to the declared 
proven reserves have virtually kept pace with cumulative oil production, making the 
methodology very inaccurate since one does not know the future appreciation of the 
reservoirs. The question is whether this is a result of the continuous extensions of the resource 
base, or if it is in the logistic curve’s nature to behave in such a way. I will take a closer look 
into the prospects of reserves in chapter 4. 
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On the other hand, it is important to be aware of the limitation of the analysis. Most important 
is the fact that even if the selected countries all had a significant oil production, the decline in 
production from these countries has not resulted in a global decline. This means that even if 
such case studies are valuable, they do not include what will happen when the global 
production peaks and eventually starts to decline. When the global production reaches the 
peak and starts to decline, it is rational to expect the world market price to increase, 
something which will influence both the supply- and the demand side in the market.   
 
4.0 The size of the ultimate reserve base 
 
As discussed in chapter 2.4, the Hubbert theory can be criticised in several ways.  The most 
important criticism is connected Hubbert’s main assumtion of a constant ultimate global 
reserve base.The lack of reliable data regarding the size of the world reserves are the major 
problem in the prospects of oil. The definistion of what to include in the reserve base brings 
clouds to the debate of peak oil, and are the main difference between the peak oil community 
and the non-peak oil community.  
According to Jackson (2006), the current peak oil debate is characterized by the following: 
Firstly, peakist arguments are built upon the Hubbert curve, a model which is highly 
questionable. As discussed in chapter 2, the curve is estimated using historical production to 
predict the future. This means that the model does not incorporate future factors like major 
new discoveries, revolutionary new technology and political influence. Secondly, the peakist 
arguments are not grounded in a credible systematic evaluation of available data. This leads to 
the debate of the size of the ultimate resource base, which is the total amount of oil in the 
world, including both known and unknow sources. A very important factor regarding the 
future of oil is the geological factors and limitations of oil production. This is in fact the most 
important argument used by the peak oil community.   
The forecasts of peak oil are controversial, because no one really knows how much oil 
remains underground and how close we are to the halfway point. Geologists have tried to 
forecast the peak for half a century, without being able to predict when the peak will arise. As 
we have seen in chapter 2, the Hubbert methodology gives an approximation to the size of the 
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world oil reserves. Therefore, I want to take a closer look at this assumption, and examnine 
how the oil reserves have evolved historically, and are likely to evolve in the future. This 
chapter will try to throw some light on the size of the reserves, and how we can expect the 
reserve base to evolve over time. In this context I will discuss conventional reserves in 
chapter 4.1 and unconventional resources in chapter 4.2.  
 
 4.1 Conventional reserves 
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, conventional reserves are defined as oil which is economically 
and technologically extractable by using a traditional well method. In the discussion of peak 
oil, the numbers which the reasoning are based upon are essential to the outcome of the 
debate. In this context it is important to emphasis that it is possible to select data to suit a 
desired argument. The peak oil community tends to pick low estimates, arguing that only 
proven reserves of conventional oil is to be considered. According to Jackson (2006), the peak 
oil community estimates the remaining oil reserves to be approximately 1.2 trillion barrels. 
Consequently, they use approximately the same numbers as the size of the world proven 
reserves (IEO 2009). By only using 1.2 trillion barrels as an estimate for the ultimate resource 
base, the peak oil community are excluding the enormous potential in probable and possible 
resources, and the yet to be found resources. They also leave out the importance of 
unconventional resources, like the oil sand in Canada, the tar belt in Orinoco, together with 
gas-to-liquid (GTL) and oil shale. According to CERA, the resource base is about 4.8 trillion 
barrels at a global scale, and only 1.1 trillion of these barrels have been exploited so fare 
(Jackson, 2006). 
Anyway, looking at only the proven conventional reserves is conservative. One should be 
quite naive believing there will be no more discoveries of oil in the world, and that no 
technological progress will contribute to the ultimate reserve base. On the other hand, it is not 
easy to comment on CERA’s numbers regarding the ultimate resource base. Even if these 
numbers are several times as large as the proven reserves, the numbers are based upon 
research, and will include the possibility of new discoveries and technological progress. On 
the other hand, the peak oil community numbers regarding the ultimate resource base are too 
low, based on the argument that there will be no future discoveries and technological 
improvement which will contribute to the size of the oil reserves. 
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Linking the debate to the methodology of Hubbert, which was presented in chapter 2, one 
needs accurate numbers regarding the ultimate resource base of an area to predict the future 
production. One can estimate the curve using the mathematical approach, which was 
presented in chapter 2.3. But, as shown in my analysis in chapter 3, the predictions made by 
the mathematical approach were poor. Nevertheless, it is not easy to predict the future, and 
one has to remember that the size of the ultimate resource base is never known for sure until 
the area is fully exploited. As an area is being exploited, the size of the known resource base 
is often expanding. As mentioned in chapter 2.4, the size of the resource base in the North Sea 
expanded with 86 percent from 1985 to 2006.  
Since the size of the ultimate resource base is important to the outcome of the debate, I will 
use the rest of chapter 4.1, trying to throw light on some facts regarding the remaining global 
conventional reserves. I will do this by taking a closer look at the situation globally, OPEC 
and the influence of the Middle East, and how long the conventional reserves are expected to 
last.  
 
4.1.1 The world 
 
The United States was the world leading producer of oil between 1901 and 1970, which was 
the year when the US production reached its all time high (Simmons, 2005). At this time the 
output from the US lower 48 states and the Gulf of Mexico reached a production of about 10 
million barrels per day. The US production started to decline in 1970, and then ended an 
almost century long dominance of world oil supply. Even if the giant oilfield, Prudhoe Bay, 
was discovered in Alaska in 1968, it did not ensure that the US would remain the world 
largest oil producer. As the world appetite for oil grew, there were only a few countries in the 
world which were able to make up the deficit. Saudi Arabia was in an exceptional position, 
since they had both the opportunity and the ability to increase its oil output fast enough, see 
section 4.1.2. 
Oil has increased its importance as a source of energy after 1945, and in 1958 it contributed to 
about half of the world demand for energy (Odell, 2004). The belief that oil would never end 
continued through the 1960s. During that decade, the oil consumption increased by about 7 
percent annually. It was not until the 1970s that people started to believe that oil is a scarce 
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resource. According to Odell & Rosing (1983), the Centre for International Energy Studies at 
Erasmus University was in the beginning of the 1980s critically investigating 12 different 
pessimistic studies of oil prospects. This illustrates the fact that pessimisms according the 
prospects of oil are not a new idea, but is something which has been seriously discussed 
among expert for decades. The oil prospects made at the end of the 1970s were pessimistic, 
concluding the world supply of oil would start to decline within a few years. This is illustrated 
in the following figure: 
 
Figure 17:  British Petroleum’s 1979 view of oil depletion. 
 
Source: Odell (2004), page 37. 
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Even if the negative prospects from the 1970s did not become reality, it is a fact that many 
important producing areas today are experiencing a declining production rate. An example is 
the North Sea, where both Norway and United Kingdom are experiencing falling production. 
According to the BP Statistical Review (2009), the Norwegian production has declined since 
2002 and the UK production reached its maximum in 1999. In 2008, the Norwegian 
production was down about 28 percent from its maximum production, while United Kingdom 
was down about 47 percent. Since the production in more and more important oil producing 
countries are declining, or is getting closer and closer to the peak, other regions in the world 
have to take over the lack of production. According to NPC Global Oil & Gas Study (2007), 
the peak of new field discoveries already occurred in the 1960s. The responsibility and ability 
to satisfy the world’s increasing demand for oil does depend heavily on the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This will be discussed in chapter 4.1.2. 
In addition to the OPEC countries, there are several promising new areas around the world. 
According to Simmons (2005), the output from the Kashagan field in Kazakhstan is expected 
to exceed more than one million barrels a day in 2015. There are also promising discoveries in 
the Azerbaijan sector in the Caspian Sea. This statement is supported by Odell (2004), who 
argues that many countries in the former Soviet Union have huge potential, and that the 
current high activity levels of international oil companies in the Caspian basin and Siberia 
indicate that there are expectations of reserves expansion in these areas. Since 2000, Shell, BP 
and ExxonMobil have signed huge contracts with Russian oil companies. The question is to 
what degree these reserves can be realized. One factor which plays a significant role is a 
question of geopolitics rather than the geographical issues like the resource potential and 
infrastructure. In the context of promising areas in the world, one also has to remember the 
deepwater regions in the Gulf of Mexico and West Africa. There are also expectations 
regarding the South Chinese Sea. The prospects of unconventional resources will be discussed 
in chapter 4.2. 
Deffeyes (2009) has a more pessimistic forecast, arguing the only promising petroleum 
province that remains unexplored is part of the South China Sea. The exploration has been 
delayed due to political problems, since there are dissensions regarding the boundaries and the 
rights to the oil. Even if the South China Sea is a promising area, there is little likelihood that 
the area is a new Middle East. If major reserves are found in a new province, it takes at least 
ten years to deliver the first barrel of oil.   
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4.1.2 OPEC and influence of the Middle East 
 
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) plays a vital role in the world oil 
market. Even if OPEC’s importance was jacked down in the 1980s, the organization is 
expected to increase its influence in the future. Esser (2005), points out that although most 
OPEC countries are close to their capacity, they are in a strong position to expand their 
production capacity close to 50 million barrels per day within 2015. According to EIA – 3, 
OPEC’s 2009 total production capacity was only about 34 million barrels per day. Much of 
this increase in capacity has to come from existing fields and existing discoveries. The 2006 
OPEC production and 2030 forecast are presented in figure 18. It is important to stress how 
the price level will influence the evolvement in capacity, at least on a short term basis. 
According to World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2009, the conventional oil production in non-
OPEC countries are expected to peak around 2010, something which means that most of the 
future increase in output would need to come from the OPEC countries. The call on OPEC to 
sustain the global supply of oil is not only a question of the OPEC countries’ ability to supply 
the world with enough oil, but it is also a question of transfering more and more political 
power towards OPEC. The organization consists of countries from all over the world, but as 
figure 18 illustrates, the most important region is the Middle East, including countries like 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Kuwait.  
 
Figure 18:  OPEC conventional liquids production by region, 2006 and 2030. 
 
Source: IEO 2009, page 39 
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The oil age in the Middle East started in the beginning of the 20
th
 century. Countries like Iran, 
Bahrain and Iraq made the region a serious oil producer almost 30 years before exploration 
even began in Saudi Arabia (Simmons, 2005). As illustrated in figure 19, over 60 percent of 
the proved reserves are located in the Middle East, giving the region an enormous influence in 
the world oil market.  
 
Figure 19: World proven reserves estimates. 
  Do not include unconventional resources. 
 
Source: Illustration based on data from BP Statistical Review (2009).  
 
 
The far largest producer in the Middle East is Saudi Arabia. Due to the large production, oil 
has become very important for the country. According to Simmons (2005), the income from 
oil counts for 70 to 80 percent of the state revenues and about 95 percent of total export 
revenues. Saudi Arabia plays the key role in the world economy when it comes to global 
energy and economic power. Their first oil discovery was done in 1938, and the last four 
decades the country has been the key supplier of oil to the rest of the world, a role which they 
got when the US production started to decline in 1970. Saudi Arabia was the only producer 
with the capacity to keep pace with the world appetite for oil. Their unique situation is linked 
to the enormous resource base which is located in the country. As figure 20 illustrates, Saudi 
Arabia alone has the hold of over 21 percent of world proven reserves. As a comparison, 
Norway contributes only 0.6 percent of world proven reserves. 
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Figure 20: World proven reserves estimates. 
 Data for the Middle East excludes Saudi Arabia. 
Do not include unconventional resources. 
 
Source: Illustration based on data from BP Statistical Review (2009).  
 
It is no doubt that Saudi Arabia has enormous oil reserves, however the estimates vary. 
According to Simmons (2005), the country has over 100 discovered oil and gas fields, and 
five of them are exceptional by any world standard. The two largest fields, Ghawar and 
Safaniya, contribute about 75 percent of the Saudi Arabic production. Ghawar is clearly the 
largest one, and even if the field has been in production for more than 50 years, it still has 
proven reserves of 70 billion tons. Saudi Aramco, the state owned Saudi Arabic oil company, 
states that Ghawar contains about 1/8 of the global reserves, something which contributes a 
reserve of about 125 billion tons. This numbers does not only illustrate Saudi Arabia’s unique 
position as a global supplier of energy, but it also illustrates the uncertainty related to the size 
of the reserves.   
The estimates regarding the Saudi Arabian oil production are uncertain. The reason is that the 
Saudi Arabian estimates to a large extent is kept secret. Thus, most of the available data are 
estimated by different energy consultants and planners around the world. Therefore, the 
available data and calculations rely on assumptions rather than verifiable information.  
Saudi Arabia has historically played an important role when it comes to stabilizing the oil 
market. If it wasn’t for Saudi Arabia, we can expect that the oil price in the 1970s would have 
increased more than it actually did. Saudi Arabia enjoyed a once-in-a millennium revenue 
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windfall. But it also had no other choice than to step into the vacuum created by the 
unexpected decline in the US production. If they hadn’t done so, it could have lead to the 
development of a global oil supply imbalance, which could have severely damaged the world 
economy.  
The capacity of the Saudi Arabian production increased very quickly in the beginning of the 
1970s, and several experts have questioned if the rush in increased production caused long 
term damage to the reservoirs. According to Simmons (2005), the experts of Saudi Aramco 
knew about the overproduction, but simply ignored it. We also have to remember that all the 
four owners of Saudi Aramco’s at that time were American. They all knew it was not long 
before the Saudi Arabian Government would nationalize the company. In that way, they had 
no incentives to have a long-term production profile regarding the Saudi Arabian wells. Saudi 
Aramco has been controlled by a Saudi Arabian management team since 1975.  
The Saudi Arabia production increased again in the beginning of the 1980s, something which 
was a result of Iran suddenly stopping its production due to the Iranian revolution in 1979. 
Also under the Iraq-Kuwait war in 1990, Saudi Arabia increased their production to 
compensate for the 5 million barrels a day which disappeared from the market. 
Looking back in time, it may seem like Saudi Arabia has had a long-standing desire to be a 
responsible and reliable provider of oil. But it has probably inadvertently caused damage to 
the Saudi Arabian reservoirs. When the oil price has decreased, their production has typically 
been reduced. Many people have seen it as a way of keeping the price up, but it may also be a 
result of the Saudi Arabian reservoirs needing to rest. 
Even if the reserves in Saudi Arabia are enormous, there are questions to be asked about what 
can be expected from Saudi Arabia in the future. The secrecy connected with the Saudi 
Arabian oil production has created a data vacuum. On the one hand, we can expect Saudi 
Arabia to overestimate its reserves to achieve power in OPEC. On the other hand, Simmons 
(2005) argues that the secrecy is a result of Saudi Arabia not wanting the rest of the world to 
know the conditions of their reservoirs. As discussed earlier, there may have been severe 
damages done to the Saudi Arabian reservoirs, and that even former experts in the state 
owned company Saudi Aramco is concerned about the Saudi Arabian prospects. The Golden 
Age of oil discoveries in Saudi Arabia was between 1941 and 1965 (Simmons, 2005). Most of 
the new discoveries have been small, complex and not very productive. Even if the resource 
base of Saudi Arabia is enormous compared with other countries and regions, there are 
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reasons to question Saudi Arabia’s ability to compensate for the falling production in other 
countries. 
 
4.1.3 How long will the conventional reserves last? 
 
Even if the prospects back in the 1970s were not that positive, the growth in reserves from 
new discoveries and appreciation of reserves in fields that have been discovered a long time 
ago, ran quickly ahead of the consumption. Between 1971 and 2000, almost 1 200 billion 
barrels of oil was added to the proven reserves, while only 682 billion barrels was consumed. 
As we see in figure 21, this caused a net increase in the proven reserves. 
 
Figure 21: Evolvement in global proven reserves 
 
Source: Based on data from BP Statistical Review (2009). 
 
Based on data from BP Statistical Review (2009), the average daily consumption of oil was 
84 455 thousand barrels (2008 numbers), and the proven reserves was equal to 1 258 billion 
barrels. By using these numbers we can easily calculate that the proven reserves will last for 
more than 40 years. This is the so called reserves to production ratio, which is the remaining 
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reserves divided with yearly production, giving us how many years the known reserves will 
last with current consumption. According to Odell (2004), the annual rate of additions to 
reserves and the maintenance of adequate reserves to production ratio are one of the three 
main drivers influencing the future of oil production. The reserves to production ratio from 
1980 to 2008 are calculated and presented in table 2.  
 
Table 2: Evolvement in the reserves to production ratio. 
Year 
Proven  
reserves  
each year 
Production  
each year 
Gross  
additions  
to reserve 
Net growth  
or decline  
in reserves 
Reserves to  
production  
ratio 
            
1980 667,2 23,0 - - 29,0 
1981 687,6 21,7 42,1 20,4 31,6 
1982 716,9 20,9 50,2 29,3 34,3 
1983 727,2 20,7 31,0 10,3 35,2 
1984 761,6 21,1 55,5 34,4 36,2 
1985 770,9 21,0 30,3 9,3 36,8 
1986 877,9 22,1 129,0 106,9 39,8 
1987 910,2 22,2 54,5 32,3 41,0 
1988 998,4 23,1 111,3 88,2 43,3 
1989 1005,8 23,4 30,8 7,4 43,0 
1990 1003,2 23,9 21,2 -2,7 42,0 
1991 1007,6 23,8 28,3 4,5 42,3 
1992 1013,3 24,0 29,7 5,7 42,2 
1993 1014,4 24,1 25,1 1,0 42,1 
1994 1019,2 24,5 29,3 4,8 41,6 
1995 1029,1 24,9 34,8 9,9 41,4 
1996 1050,6 25,5 47,0 21,5 41,2 
1997 1069,3 26,3 45,0 18,7 40,6 
1998 1068,5 26,8 26,1 -0,8 39,8 
1999 1088,6 26,4 46,5 20,1 41,2 
2000 1104,5 27,3 43,2 15,9 40,4 
2001 1133,0 27,3 55,8 28,5 41,5 
2002 1180,0 27,2 74,2 47,0 43,4 
2003 1206,3 28,1 54,4 26,3 42,9 
2004 1211,3 29,3 34,3 5,0 41,4 
2005 1220,3 29,6 38,5 9,0 41,2 
2006 1240,6 29,7 50,0 20,3 41,7 
2007 1261,0 29,7 50,2 20,5 42,4 
2008 1258,0 29,9 26,8 -3,0 42,1 
 
Source: Calculations based on data from BP Statistical Review (2009). 
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Table 2 also demonstrates the weakness of using the reserve to production ratio as a 
measurement of future resource availability. The reason is that it is based on the proven 
reserves, which is an accounting concept based on known projects. Thus, this is not an 
appropriate measurement for judging resource availability in the long term. Over time, new 
resources will be added to the proved reserves. This means that even if large amount of oil is 
consumed every year, the ratio stays the same.  
Even if the reserve to production ratio is not an accurate measurement for future resource 
availability, it is still a measurement illustrating the fact that the world is not running out of 
oil on a short term basis. As table 2 illustrates, the reserve to production ratio has been stable 
for the last 20 years, fluctuating around 40 years. However, it is important to remember that 
peak oil supply may not occur due to the lack of oil in a geological view, but because of 
problems getting the oil quickly enough to the market. There is a possibility of limited supply 
as a result of limited capacity. The issue of limitations regarding capacity will be covered in 
chapter 4.  
International Energy Outlook (IEO) 2009, published by the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) of the US Department of Energy, argues the global supply of crude oil, 
other liquid hydrocarbons, and biofuels is expected to be adequate to meet the world’s 
demand for liquid fuels for at least the next 25 years. As already mentioned, there is 
substantial uncertainty regarding the levels of future demand and supply. In the IEO 2009, 
EIA reflects some of this uncertainty by using both low and high oil price cases, in addition to 
a reference case. But, the oil resources currently remaining, in combination with expected 
volumes of other liquid fuels, are estimated to meet the total demand for liquid fuels in all 
three prices cases. 
It is interesting to see how the assessments of proven reserves have evolved over time. This is 
illustrated in figure 22.  
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Figure 22: Assessments of total world initial oil reserves over the period 1940 -2000. 
 
Source: Odell (2004), page 47. 
Even if the assessments have increased gradually in the period from 1940 to 2000, it is 
obvious that the rate of increasing proven reserves is waning. The most common explanation 
is that the largest oil reservoirs are already found, leaving only smaller and smaller reservoirs 
left to be found. This statement is supported by Roberts (2005). But it may also be a result of 
incidental historical happenings. In the first part of this period, from 1940 to 1970, large 
explorations were done in Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Middle East (Odell, 2004). 
From the 1970s, the oil industry in these countries was nationalized, and the interest in 
ultimate reserves in the Middle East evaporated. In addition to the evaporating interest of 
developing the oil industry in many of the most important oil regions in the world, the growth 
rate in demand fell sharply in the 1970s, after a annually growth rate of 7.5 percent between 
1950 and 1973. This undermines the previously perceived need for large volumes of future 
supplies. At the same time, more intensive appraisal for the oil wealth in other parts of the 
world became of great interest, both in developed and developing countries. All these factors 
added together may give a rational explanation to the waning increase in addition to proven 
reserves, and throw light on the fact that there are other explanations than just the lack of new 
resources which decide the size of the proven reserves.   
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Another interesting observation is the fact that the growth rate in conventional oil production 
is flattening. This is used by the peak oil community as a sign that we are very close to the 
peak. According to Jackson (2006), the slowing growth in conventional production may 
reflect two factors. Firstly, there is a lack of knowledge about what hydrocarbon resources the 
industry will develop in the future. Secondly, the high oil price will increase the development 
of unconventional reserves. As an example, Norway’s largest oil company, Statoil, is heavily 
involved in projects regarding the oil sand in Canada. Just like many others, the company 
diversifies its portfolio away from conventional reserves, something which relieves the 
pressure on the traditional conventional resources. In addition to the unconventional 
resources, there is also more attention paid to other sources of energy.  
One of the latest interesting claims in the debate of peak oil is given by the chief economist in 
the International Energy Agency (IEA), Fatih Birol, who belives the output of conventional 
oil will peak in 2020 (Economist, 2009). This claim is based on the assumption that no big 
new discoveries are made. It is just recently that the IEA committed itself to a prediction of 
when the world oil production will stop growing. The conventional oil is expected to reach 
the maksimal production, the platau, sometime before 2030. IEA made this conclusion after 
analysing the historical production trends of 800 individual oilfields. IEA concluded that oil-
fields that are past their prime can experience a decline in annual output equal to 8.6 percent 
in average in 2030. Even if unconvential resources are expected to take a lot of the slack, one 
has to remember that unconventional sources liberate more carbon dioxide than conventional 
resources, something which is in conflict with the request of mitigation due to climate change. 
Unconventional resources will be discussed more closely in chapter 4.2. 
In addition to IEAs Fatih Birol, various top leaders in large international oil companies have 
made public their rather pessimistic prospects of oil production (Roberts, 2008). One of them 
is James Mulva, chief executive officer (CEO) of ConocoPhillips. He predicts that in 2030, 
almost all the oil needed has to come from fields not currently in operation, and he 
emphasizes his concern regarding where that oil is suppose to come from. His statement is 
supported by the Royal Dutch Shell’s CEO, Jeroen van der Veer, who argues that after 2015 
the supply of easy-to-access oil and gas will no longer keep up with demand. It is a fact that 
smaller fields cost more to operate than larger ones, and even if the world has numerous small 
fields all over the globe, it will in most cases not be economically or technically feasible to 
extract the oil. Van der Veer states that the biggest fields were discovered decades ago, and 
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most of today’s oil is coming from big mature fields which are already in decline or close to 
their peaks.  
 
4.2 Unconventional reserves 
 
As discussed in chapter 4.1, the production from conventional reserves is expected to peak 
within 10 to 20 years. But, one has to remember that the future of oil does not only include 
conventional oil. In addition, the future will also involve production of so called 
unconventional oil. According to Odell (2004), unconventional oil can be defined as oil which 
has to be recovered from habitats other than reservoirs in which oil occurs as a liquid with a 
viscosity which makes it capable of flowing or being pumped to the surface. There is no 
absolute distinction between conventional and unconventional oil. From an economic point of 
view, it reflects the ability to derive useful petroleum products, or products which may work 
as substitutes for traditional oil products.  
The idea of developing unconventional resources is definitely not a new idea. Both the 
offshore fields in the Gulf of Mexico and the fields in the North Sea are examples of what 
earlier would have been impossible to extract and therefore classified as unconventional. It is 
the same case with extraction of heavy oil, where technological improvements have made it 
economically feasible to extract the oil. This illustrates the fact that unconventional resources 
become conventional over time, as a result of technological progress. This is a continuous 
process, meaning that what is unconventional today may be conventional tomorrow. 
According to Odell (2004), increased knowledge and improving technology have already led 
to more than 50 percent real cost reduction in unconventional oil production. With the oil 
price level remaining at a relatively high level, we may expect large scale developments to 
come, especially in Canada and Venezuela.  
The prospects of oil will give significant motivation to a comprehensive and systematic 
evaluation of the ultimately recoverable resource base, and as production from non-
conventional resources are getting relatively more and more favorable, the production will 
increase, and thus compensate for the declining supply from conventional resources. This is 
illustrated in figure 23. 
 
48 
 
Figure 23: Production curves for conventional and unconventional oil 
 
Source: Replication of Odell (2004), page 49.  
 
As figure 23 illustrates, taking the unconventional resources into account will move the peak 
further into the future. How far is a question which remains open, since nobody is able to 
predict the future for sure. But, as more and more of the conventional resources are 
consumed, the unconventional resources are getting more and more important as a future 
source of energy. Figure 24 illustrates the importance of how unconventional resources play 
an important role in the debate of when a peak will be reached. 
 
Figure 24: Illustration of the complementary relationship of conventional and 
unconventional production. 
 
Source: Replication of Odell (2004), page 49. 
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Odell (2004) argues that the sum of both conventional and unconventional reserves will not 
peak until 2060, even if the peak in conventional reserves is expected to be reached 30 to 40 
years earlier. The calculations are based on an assumption of a total ultimate recoverable 
resource base of non-conventional oil equal to 3000 billion barrels. The supplies of 
conventional and unconventional resources can be viewed as complementary for most of the 
21
st
 century. But, even if a lot of emphasis is put on the use of unconventional resources, it 
will take until 2030 for the production to exceed 1 gigatons of oil equivalent (Gtoe) per year. 
It will take until 2060 before non-conventional oil becomes the most important source of 
supply.  
According to IEO 2009 reference case, the demand for liquid fuel and other petroleum 
products like natural gas liquids, biofuels and liquids derived from other hydrocarbon sources 
will increase from 85 million barrels a day in 2006 to 107 million barrels per day in 2030. 
Unconventional liquids will in 2030 count for 13.4 million barrels per day, or 12.6 percent of 
the total demand. Today, unconventional liquids only count for 3.6 percent of the total 
demand. The relative share is illustrated in figure 25. 
 
 
Figure 25: World liquids supply in three price scenarios, 2006 and 2030. 
  Reference price equal to 130 US $. 
  Low price equal to 50 US $. 
  High price equal to 200 US $. 
 
 
Source: IEO 2009, page 31. 
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As figure 25 illustrates, there is an increased supply of unconventional resources in both the 
reference case and in the low and high price scenarios. The reference case is based on a price 
equal to 130 US dollars per barrel in 2030, respectively, while low and high oil prices are set 
to 50 and 200 US dollars per barrel. As expected, the supply of unconventional liquids will be 
highest in the case of a high oil price. The expected growth in the use of unconventional 
resources is illustrated in figure 26.  
 
Figure 26: World production of unconventional liquid fuels, 2006 and 2030. 
  The figure contains three different price scenarios.  
  Reference price equal to 130 US $. 
  Low price equal to 50 US $. 
  High price equal to 200 US $. 
 
 
Source: IEO 2009, page 23. 
 
As the figure illustrates, the increased use of unconventional liquid fuels are mainly based on 
increased use of extra-heavy oil, biofuels and oil sand. The potential of all these 
unconventional resources is heavily debated. It is well known that huge amount of resources 
is needed to support production, and large investments will be needed to bring the oil to the 
market. Another issue is the uncertain timing of such investments. According to IEO 2009, 
OPEC’s unconventional production consists mainly of extra-heavy oil from Venezuela’s 
Orinoco belt and gas-to-liquids (GTL) production from Qatar. In the IEO 2009 reference case, 
the Venezuelan and Qatar unconventional production in sum increases from 0.6 million 
barrels per day in 2006 to 1.4 million barrels per day in 2030. The known Venezuelan 
reserves have increased significantly since 2005. According to E24 (2010), the Venezuela 
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reserves have recently been adjusted upwards with 39.9 billion barrels. It means that the 
Orinoco belt now may account for as much as 235 billion barrels of oil. If these numbers are 
correct, it means that Venezuela unofficially has the second largest oil reserves in the world.  
 
Outside OPEC, the unconventional resources are located in many different countries, and 
include a diverse group of resource types. In total, non-OPEC countries will increase their 
production with about 9.6 million barrels a day from 2006 to 2030, with 65 percent coming 
from OECD countries. The country with the largest contribution is Canada, with an increased 
production of 3.1 million barrels per day. In 2002, no less than 178 billion barrels of non-
conventional oil in western Canada were formally declared as proven reserves. This means 
that Canada officially is the second largest oil country in the world, measured by the size of 
the global known reserves. According to the reference case in IEO 2009, the Canadian 
production from oil sands will make up more than 35 percent of the total non-OPEC 
unconventional production in 2030. Another large producer is the United States, which is 
expected to increase its production of unconventional oil with 2.2 million barrels per day, 
with 1.5 million barrels per day coming from biofuel production. In total, the world’s 
production of biofuels will increase by 0.9 million barrels per day in 2006 to 5.9 million 
barrels per day in 2030. The increased production corresponds to an annual increase of 8.6 
percent. The growth of biofuel production slows in all the cases in the near term as current 
generation crops reach their economic potential. The long term potential is larger due to the 
advent of new technologies using cellulosic feedstock. The countries with the largest potential 
in different unconventional reserves are summarized in table 3.  
 
Table 3:  Summary of the largest unconventional potential  
   
 
Country 
 
Size of reserve 
(billion barrels) 
 
 
Expected production in 2030 
(million barrels per day) 
 
Type of oil 
Venezuela  
(OPEC member) 
 
 
235  
 
1.4  
 
Extra-heavy oil 
Canada  
(non-OPEC 
member) 
 
178  
 
3.1  
 
Oil sand 
United States  
(non-OPEC 
member) 
 
Mainly biofuels, which 
give no reserves 
 
2.2 
 
Biofuel 
 
Source: E24 (2010) and IEO 2009. 
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In order to achieve national goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and bolstering energy 
security, many countries have targeted use of biofuels and provided tax credits to biofuel 
producers. Biofuel is supposed to be economically favorable, since the cost of production is 
likely to fall over time, and the price of oil is likely to increase. The higher the price of 
conventional oil becomes, the more economically competitive will biofuel be. According to 
the IEO 2009 reference case, the low oil price scenario will lead to a production of 4.8 million 
barrels per day in 2030, while a high oil price scenario will lead to a production of biofuel of 
7.2 million barrels per day. 
 
 
4.3 Summary 
 
Based on the discussion in chapter 4, I will conclude that is not easy to predict the size of the 
ultimate resource base. In the debate, one has to take into account the fact that human’s ability 
and needs are dynamic, and today’s energy resource incorporate some of yesterdays 
unknown. Thus, while tomorrow’s energy resources of carbon fuels will undoubtedly induce 
components relating not only to already known, but as yet unproducible reserves, they will 
also incorporate reserves from today’s unknown potential in still unexplored habitats. It is 
difficult to predict the future, but one has to be rather naive believing there will be no 
technological progress making more and more resources economically feasible. As discussed 
in chapter 4.1, most of the remaining conventional reserves are located in OPEC, something 
which will increase OPECs influence in the energy market. But as the production of 
conventional reserves will flatten, and eventually start to fall, the unconventional resources 
will be more important moving energy political power towards new countries. But, the 
question of how unconventional resources can work as substitutes for conventional oil still 
remains open.  
One has to question the quality of the dataset used in my discussion. The estimates of proven 
reserves are available in a number of different publications, such as the BP Statistical Review 
and the Oil and Gas Journal. But there are reasons the question if these data can be relied 
upon. This means that my conclusion may rely on data which is not accurate and reliable.  
 
53 
 
5.0 The importance of above ground factors  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, the size of the world’s oil reserves is a critical factor in the 
traditional peak oil theory. Further, chapter 4 showed us that we cannot take the size of oil 
reserves as given. To allow for both human ability and human needs in the evaluation of 
carbon fuels prospects, two basic assumptions must be made. Firstly, one has to assume the 
world knowledge in geology and technology regarding extraction will continue to evolve in 
the future. Secondly, the world’s growing population and economy will generate a continuing 
increase in the demand for energy on a long term basis. 
The historical evolution requires a constant evolvement of which oil reserves that can be set in 
to use, for instance the importance of unconventional reserves. This acknowledgement tells us 
that when predicting the future supply of oil, we have to take into consideration not only the 
uncertainty connected to geological factors in the reservoirs, but we also have to pay attention 
to the above ground risk. Critical factors are found on both the supply and the demand side, 
for instance lack of investments, politics, and economic growth.  
One has to remember that supply and demand are closely related. Demand normally follows 
macroeconomic fluctuations. Due to the recent recession, the focus has been on demand 
constraints. As the world economy recovers, there will probably be a shift in focus back to the 
supply side. The reason is that many of the world’s producers of oil have reached their 
maximum production, and some have already started to decline. Even if there has been excess 
supply during the recessions, there may be problems satisfying the expected demand. 
According to Fattouh (2010) there have, until recently, been expectations that short time oil 
price behavior are resting on the assumption that changes in oil prices would induce responses 
or feedback from supply, demand or policy. A feedback in one of these, or a combination of 
all three, would prevent prices from getting below a certain floor or above a certain ceiling. 
This can be illustrated in the following two examples: 
Firstly, in the case of a price increase, some feedback mechanism will prevent the price to go 
above a certain ceiling. On the demand side, the feedbacks from the high price level operate 
through both a price effect and an income effect. A high oil price will slow economic growth, 
something which will have a detrimental effect on the oil demand. On the supply side, higher 
oil price will encourage higher investments in the oil sector, something which induces 
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increasing supply. However, there will be a multiyear lag; since it takes years from 
investments are done until they influence the supply. If the oil price rises relatively to other 
sources of energy, the high oil price will encourage substitution, and thus put a downward 
pressure on the oil price. 
Secondly, in the case of a price decrease, some feedback mechanisms will prevent the price to 
fall below a certain level. On the demand side, lower prices induce economic growth, 
something which increases the demand for oil. On the supply side, lower prices discourage 
investments in the oil industry. Less investment induces lower supply, especially in the non-
OPEC countries. A low oil price discourages substitution, since oil is a relatively cheaper 
source of energy when the price is low. This will put a upward pressure on the oil price. 
 
5.1 Critical factors on the supply side 
 
Lack of supply may be a result of one or several factors, including both geological and above 
ground factors like lack of investments and political factors. As discussed in chapter 4, the 
world long term supply of oil heavily depends on the Middle East, where 60 percent of the 
world’s proven conventional reserves are found. Thus, the possibility to increase the world’s 
supply is also high in this area.  
On a medium and longer term basis, one can argue that there are problems regarding 
increased production in the Middle East. Firstly, there are huge political risks in many of these 
countries, especially in Iran and Iraq. Secondly, there is a trend of increasing nationalization 
of oil fields. Thirdly, there may be problems regarding increased protectionism. Based on 
these three factors, there may be problems increasing the future capacity in the Middle East. 
In total, the above ground risk is mainly connected to the lack of investments and politics. I 
will discuss these two factors further in chapter 5.1.1 and 5.1.2. 
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5.1.1 Lack of investments 
 
According to the NPC Global Oil & Gas Study (2007), both sides in the peak oil debate 
emphasize the importance of facilities and capital equipment. In many areas the technology 
and infrastructure is aging, and new technologies are required to maintain production and 
explore new areas. The situation differs heavily from country to country. According to Odell 
(2004), investments in new technology to enhance the capabilities of oilfields have largely 
been limited to North America and the North Sea. In the Middle East, the impact from 
nationalization of oil companies in the 1970s and 1980s, combined with subsequent financial, 
managerial and technical limitations, has made the upstream oil industry in the world’s most 
significant oil producing region now being outdated. Taking into account how large the 
already proven reserves are in the Middle East, we may expect enormous additional reserves 
to be proved when new technology are incorporated in these areas. An appreciation of oil 
fields in these areas may take place as joint ventures between the various state corporations 
and international oil companies, and lately agreements to update the industry are emerging. 
Similarly, the oil industries in the former Soviet Union have a large potential and we may 
expect new technologies and methodologies to revolutionize the upstream oil industry in 
countries like Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The proven 
reserves in these countries have increased by 40 percent in 2002, compared with one decade 
earlier.  
According to WEO 2009, the lack of investments will have far-reaching consequences. Due to 
the recent financial crises, the energy investments worldwide have decreased. It has resulted 
in energy companies drilling fewer oil and gas wells, and cutting back investments in 
infrastructure such as for instance pipelines and refineries. In addition, many ongoing projects 
have been delayed. As illustrated in figure 27, the global oil and gas upstream investment 
budget for 2009 have been cut by about 19 percent compared with 2008.  
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Figure 27: Worldwide upstream capital expenditures. 
     * Based on company plans.  
 
Source: WEO 2009, page 146. 
 
The oil sand projects in Canada account for a large share of the investment cut. One reason 
may be the cost level of production. The falling investment level in the energy sector may 
have long lasting effects, and depending on how governments are responding, it may lead to 
problems regarding the security of future energy supply. It is especially the long term projects 
which are suffering. This probably has to do with the risk connected to these projects. Since 
many of the most economically feasible wells already have been drilled, one has to go into 
project were the net present value of the project is lower.    
Jackson (2006) interestingly points out that even the peak oil community is now putting more 
emphasis on issues like infrastructure and other above ground risks, and less emphasis on the 
argument that the world is running out of oil in terms of physical resources. This may be the 
initial phase of a new way of thinking for the peak oil community, and indicates that the 
actual risk may lie above ground.  
Even though the investment level have been cut, figure 27 shows us that the level of 
investment in 2009 was still relatively high compared with the last ten years.  
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5.1.2 Politics 
 
According to Odell (2004), the importance of regional issues will be less for oil supply 
compared with coal and gas. The reason is that both the producers and suppliers are dispersed 
all over the world, and due to low cost of transportation there is a well functioning global oil 
market. As discussed in chapter 4.1.2, about 60 percent of the world’s proven reserves are 
concentrated in the Middle East. Odell argues that if no big discoveries are done outside the 
Middle East, it is likely that the Middle East’s share of the world ultimately recoverable 
conventional oil will remain over 50 percent in the future. Secure future oil delivery therefore 
heavily depend on Saudi Arabia’s willingness to bring the oil to the market. 
Since the 1970s, there has been a much stronger relative growth in the upstream industry 
outside the Middle East. Development of new technologies and the desire of being less 
dependent on oil supply from the Middle East, made continents like Europe and North- and 
South America invest in their own production capacity. It seems like geopolitical factors have 
been the main driver for the development of the industry, rather than the geographical location 
of the oil. At the same time, the enormous economic growth in Southeast Asia has made a 
market for the Arabian oil.  
Even if both production and consumption of oil is highly spread around the globe, there are 
some huge players on both sides. As illustrated in figure 28, the main importers of oil are the 
United States and Europe, while the main exporters are the Middle East and the former Soviet 
Union. 
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Figure 28: Oil import and export 
Numbers are including both export and import of crude and products. 
 
Source: Based on data from BP Statistical Review (2009).  
 
As already discussed in chapter 4, many important oil producing countries do have a declining 
production rate. On a short term basis, this means that the world may face a period of more 
dependence on the Middle East as an oil supplier. If the counties in the Middle East are 
willing to supply the demanded amounts of oil remains to see. Historically, countries like 
Saudi Arabia have been pioneers when it comes to stabilizing the world market for oil. The 
future dependence on Arabic oil will to a great extent depend on countries in the former 
Soviet Union. In these countries we see increasing activity of large international oil 
companies in joint venture with local corporations. Based on my discussion in chapter 4, we 
may expect the production in these areas to increase. But as stressed before, increasing 
production depends heavily on geopolitical factors, rather than the geological existence of oil. 
But in the longer term, Odell (2004) argues that we can expect this global energy situation to 
change as the production from conventional resources will start to decline and more and more 
non-conventional resources are brought into the market. Odell expects the contribution from 
unconventional resources to be about 50 percent of the world’s supply in 2060. As the 
production of conventional oil is peaking, countries like Canada and Venezuela will gradually 
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be more important suppliers of oil. This illustrates the fact of changing world economic 
power, as non-conventional oil resources are situated in countries which have not historically 
been large suppliers of oil.  
Another important issue when it comes to politics is the limitations on some very oil abundant 
countries. According to IEO 2009, the total production in Iran is expected to be restricted for 
years to come due to political factors. The production is not limited to international factors, 
but rather as a result of low effectiveness in the national oil company’s operations and the 
government and foreign investor’s ability to agree on contract terms. In the IEO 2009 
reference case, Iran’s oil production will decline through 2020 due to both financial and 
political constraints. However, in the longer term, the production is projected to increase. In 
Venezuela, the government’s reaction to the recent high oil prices was to limit foreign direct 
investments and access to its reserves. IEO 2009 expects this to limit the Venezuelan 
potential.  
This illustrates that politics are an important factor in the energy market. The key challenge is 
to understand the impact of decision making and political uncertainties on project execution.  
 
5.2 Critical factors on the demand side 
 
The future of demand is an important factor when it comes to the discussion of future supply 
of oil. The demand side is not only something which has to respond when the peak is reached, 
and the supply side does not manage to satisfy the increasing demand. The future demand will 
also play an important role in shaping the peak. As the NPC Global Oil & Gas Study (2007) 
argues, the demand will influence when the peak is reached. High demand will force the peak 
to come earlier and increase the post-peak decline rate in the oil production. In this context 
one has to remember that as the demand for oil rises, and the risk for a peak oil production to 
be close in time also increases. 
The prospects for future energy demand are not easy to predict. According to Odell (2004), 
there is a historical trend of overestimating future demand. Demand for oil will increase with 
1.5 percent annually as long as the evolution of reserves makes it possible. Odell predicts the 
increase in demand to continue until about 2060.  
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According to IEO 2009, the consumption of oil is expected to continue to grow until at least 
2030. As illustrated in figure 29, the consumption for oil will increase from 472 quadrillion 
British thermal units (Btu) to 678 quadrillion Btu between 2006 and 2030, something which 
represents an increase of 44 percent.  
 
Figure 29: World marketed energy consumption, both historical and projections. 
  
Source: IEO 2009, page 7. 
 
In the discussion regarding the demand side, it is important to stress what will be the main 
drivers. Demand is a question of price. A high oil price will both put a downward pressure on 
demand and give incentives to develop substitutes. It is a question of the existence of a 
backstop price, which is the price level where substitutes are getting cheaper than oil and 
therefore are taking over as the supplier of energy. Examples of such substitutes may be 
different sources of renewables, coal, natural gas and nuclear.  
Odell (2004) stresses the point of natural gas as a substitute for oil. Through the 21
st
 century, 
oil’s contribution to the total hydrocarbon supply will fall from 63.8 percent in 2000, down to 
only about 29 percent in 2100. This reflects the resource base constraint, and is also likely to 
indicate demand constraint. During the 21
st
 century, it is likely that the global hydrocarbon 
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industry will turn its attention and investments towards natural gas. This is due to both 
economic reasons and environmental reasons. This reasoning illustrates that the world will not 
run out of oil, and that natural gas may become the most significant contributor to the global 
hydrocarbon market in the 21
st
 century. Due to new technology one is able to extract 
enormous amount of gas from sources, which earlier have been classified as unconventional. 
Thus the future prospects of gas may be very promising. 
Deffeyes (2009) stresses how the oil cost as a percentage of the world domestic product is 
evolving. As the price of crude oil is increasing, more and more of the total GDP is connected 
to the cost of oil. In that way the increasing crude oil price is working as a brake on the 
growth in the world economy. Around the globe we see the consequences of high oil prices 
rippling through the economy. For instance, the cost of food production is highly and 
positively correlated with the cost of fuel, making food more expensive when the fuel price is 
increasing. Another example is how producers of large and heavy cars, due to higher fuel 
prices, are losing market shares to smaller and more fuel efficient cars. 
Another factor which is important regarding future demand for oil is economic growth. IEO 
2008 declares that „„economic activity remains the principal driver of oil demand in all 
regions. Since 1980, each 1 % per year increase in GDP has been accompanied by a 0.3 % 
rise in primary oil demand‟‟. This illustrates that there is a strong relation between oil and 
economic growth. Thus, the prospects of economic growth will be an indicator of future oil 
demand. But, the relationship between energy use and economic development is differentiated 
between different levels of development. As illustrated in figure 30, economic growth in 
developing countries requires a relatively higher increase in the use of energy compared to 
developed countries.  
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Figure 30:  Relationship between energy use and economic development over time. 
 
Source: Replication of Odell (2004), page 3. 
 
The high economic growth in very populous countries like India and China is likely to require 
enormous amounts of energy. According to Odell (2004), the world’s developing countries 
will play a rising relative role in both global energy use and CO2 emissions. We may expect 
few of these countries to pay attention to climate change. In their choice between clean energy 
and economic growth, they are expected to pay more attention to the cost of energy, than the 
source of energy. Looking at the costs related to the different sources of energy, we may 
expect the demand for oil, gas and coal to increase in the future. After 2050, the world 
population is predicted to stabilize at about 9 billion inhabitants. Since a growing world 
population is one of the factors causing the world demand for energy to increase, a stabilizing 
population is likely to make the growth rate for energy fall gradually.  
According to Dagens Næringsliv (2010), there has already been a demand peak in the use of 
oil in the developed countries. Due to improvement in energy efficiency, there are no reasons 
to believe that the demand for oil in the developed countries will ever reach the old peak level 
again. British Petroleum chief economist Christof Rühl argues that economic growth needs 
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energy, but that the developed countries only need about 1/3 of the energy which developing 
countries need to achieve the same economic growth. It is all about fundamental change, 
where the OECD countries never will use the same amount of oil again. One consequence is 
that in a short time perspective, the world will not face a new dramatic increase in the oil price 
like we saw in 2008. 
The main reason why Rühl argues that the peak demand has been reached is because the oil 
consumption started to decrease in 2005, years before the financial slowdown. In Dagens 
Næringsliv (2010), British Petroleum states that the developed countries consume about 52 
percent of world oil consumption, a share that will decrease to 33 percent in 2030. This 
statement is supported by Brad Corson, vice president of ExxonMobil Corporation. He argues 
that the world energy consumption will increase by about 35 percent from 2005 to 2030. This 
is only half the increase which was expected by ExxonMobil in 2005, and it strongly 
illustrates the effect of improving energy efficiency.  
The fact of decreasing oil demand in the developed world supports the idea of a demand peak. 
Even if the only sign of falling oil demand is found in the developed countries, it does 
illustrate that there may be a future peak in oil production, not due to lack of oil, but because 
the global demand of oil starts to decrease.  
 
5.3  Summary 
 
As discussed in this chapter, there are different critical factors affecting the future of oil, 
which is not directly connected to geological factors. Critical factors are found on both the 
supply and the demand side, and are including investment level, politics and falling demand. 
Each of these, or combination, may lead to a production peak. This illustrates how there may 
be a future peak in production, not as a result of traditional peak oil arguments, but due to 
critical above ground factors.  
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6.0 Conclusion 
 
Future evolution in oil production and oil prices are highly debated. During the last few years 
the world has faced a rapid price increase, reaching a maximum close to 150 dollars per barrel 
in July 2008. Even if the world has faced fast growing prices before, especially in the 1970s, 
the world looks a bit different today. In the 1970s, new oil provinces like the Gulf of Mexico 
and Norway was ready to compensate for the reduced OPEC production. Today, several 
major oil production provinces are facing, or are close of reaching, a declining production 
rate. Unlike the 1970s, there are no obvious new oil provinces ready to replace this 
production, at least not on a short term basis. In addition, some very populous countries like 
China and India have a high economic growth, something which demands enormous amounts 
of energy.  
During this thesis I have done a critical review of the peak oil phenomenon, and tried to look 
closer into the fundamental concept behind the debate. In short, the debate is divided by the 
peak oil community and the non peak oil community. The former community argues that 
geological factors in near future will trigger a production peak followed by a rapid decrease in 
oil production. On the other hand, the latter community believes that oil production will 
continue to grow for many decades before it eventually flatten.  
The Hubbert curve has undoubtedly given fuel to the peak oil debate. As presented in chapter 
2, the Hubbert curve has both a geometrical and a mathematical approach. Through my 
analysis of the mathematical approach in chapter 3, I found that both the US and the 
Norwegian, but also partly the UK production, follows the Hubbert curve. The fact that these 
countries’ production paths seems to follow the Hubbert curve adds weight to peak oil 
community’s arguments. 
In my further analysis of the mathematical approach I revealed that the Hubbert curve gives 
very inaccurate predictions for the US, the Norwegian and the UK production paths. In fact, 
as long as the peak is not reached, my analysis revealed that the methodology systematically 
predicts the peak in production to arise within 2 to 6 years. The Hubbert curve’s generally 
tendency to predict the production peak in near future may explain the peak oil community’s 
rather unsuccessful attempt in predicting peak oil for more than half a century. The 
community’s ardency for predicting peak oil in near future may also rely on their need for 
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reaching the headlines to keep the debate alive. Based on my analysis of the mathematically 
approach, I will conclude that the Hubbert methodology is a useful tool when explaining the 
past, but it has very limited practical use when it comes to predict the future.  
It is important to stress that even though each province or country may have a production path 
similar to the Hubbert curve, the global peak is getting higher and higher and moves ahead in 
time as we continuously add new resources and look at them collectively. Looking back in 
history, the reserves have evolved over time, and will probably continue to do so for many 
years to come. When discussing future reserves, it is important to stress how the reserves are 
likely to evolve over time. Even if the demand for oil has increased more or less gradually the 
last decades, the net proven reserves have continued to grow. It seems like most experts now 
predicts the peak to arise within 10 to 20 years. For oil production in total, it remains to see 
how unconventional resources may work as a substitute for conventional oil. Personally, and 
based on historically progress, I expect that unconventional resources will play an important 
role in the future, at least on longer terms.  
The next important issue I want to summarize is what will happen when the peak is reached. 
On the one hand, the peak oil community argues the global production will fall rapidly. This 
statement may have its origin in the Hubbert curve which is symmetrical in time. There is no 
doubt that a fast decreasing global production will strongly influence the world economy. On 
the other hand, the non peak oil community has a more dynamic view. Higher price will give 
incentives to develop new fields and technology to make use of unconventional resources, 
something which will secure the supply of oil for many years to come. This supports the idea 
that the global production does not necessary need to fall rapidly after peaking, but rather 
stabilize at a production plateau which can be maintained for decades. At least I expect the 
global production path not to be symmetrical in time, but rather have a long tale. Based on 
this reasoning, the world will have plenty of time to adapt to a world without oil, and the 
policymakers do not have to fear a sudden lack of long lasting oil supply. Still, I do think 
policymakers should prepare for an establishment of a much higher oil price level in the 
future.     
As discussed in chapter 5, various non-geological factors may trigger peak oil. This means 
that a peak in production may arise due to factors which are not grounded in the traditional 
peak oil arguments. On the supply side, lack of investment may cause bottlenecks which can 
prevent the oil to get fast enough to the market. Further, both national and international 
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politics can influence production. As more and more of the relative share of remaining oil are 
situated in fewer and fewer countries, the right to the oil will give more power in the future 
international politics. This is something policymakers should be aware of. Demand is another 
above ground factor which can trigger a production peak. This simply because changing 
demand will regulate when the peak is to arise. Both the supply side factors and demand side 
factors are closely related to macroeconomic fluctuations. Thus, policymakers in countries 
where oil is the main economic driver should be aware that a major downturn in the global 
economy can have dramatically consequences for their country’s economy.  
Even if my thesis has revealed that the production of oil seems to remain high for many years 
to come, it has also revealed that there are some dark clouds in the horizon. Based on my 
personal view, peak oil will not occur as a result of oil scarcity, at least not in a geological 
sense, but rather as a result of above ground risks. Further, I believe that a change in energy 
regime will be a slow process, something which will make carbon fuel dominate the 21
st
 
century’s global energy economy.  
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Appendixes 
 
Appendix A – United States crude production (1900 – 2008) 
 
Dataset is based on EIA – 1.  
Data is given as million barrels annually, and includes all 50 states. 
Year Production   Year Production   Year Production 
1900 64 
 
1937 1278 
 
1974 3203 
1901 69 
 
1938 1213 
 
1975 3057 
1902 89 
 
1939 1264 
 
1976 2976 
1903 100 
 
1940 1503 
 
1977 3009 
1904 117 
 
1941 1404 
 
1978 3178 
1905 135 
 
1942 1385 
 
1979 3121 
1906 126 
 
1943 1506 
 
1980 3146 
1907 166 
 
1944 1678 
 
1981 3129 
1908 179 
 
1945 1714 
 
1982 3157 
1909 183 
 
1946 1733 
 
1983 3171 
1910 210 
 
1947 1857 
 
1984 3250 
1911 220 
 
1948 2020 
 
1985 3275 
1912 223 
 
1949 1842 
 
1986 3168 
1913 248 
 
1950 1974 
 
1987 3047 
1914 266 
 
1951 2248 
 
1988 2979 
1915 281 
 
1952 2290 
 
1989 2779 
1916 301 
 
1953 2357 
 
1990 2685 
1917 335 
 
1954 2315 
 
1991 2707 
1918 356 
 
1955 2484 
 
1992 2625 
1919 378 
 
1956 2617 
 
1993 2499 
1920 443 
 
1957 2617 
 
1994 2431 
1921 472 
 
1958 2449 
 
1995 2394 
1922 558 
 
1959 2575 
 
1996 2366 
1923 732 
 
1960 2575 
 
1997 2355 
1924 714 
 
1961 2622 
 
1998 2282 
1925 620 
 
1962 2676 
 
1999 2147 
1926 771 
 
1963 2753 
 
2000 2131 
1927 901 
 
1964 2787 
 
2001 2118 
1928 901 
 
1965 2849 
 
2002 2097 
1929 1007 
 
1966 3028 
 
2003 2073 
1930 898 
 
1967 3216 
 
2004 1983 
1931 851 
 
1968 3329 
 
2005 1890 
1932 785 
 
1969 3372 
 
2006 1862 
1933 906 
 
1970 3517 
 
2007 1848 
1934 908 
 
1971 3454 
 
2008 1812 
1935 994 
 
1972 3455 
   1936 1099 
 
1973 3361 
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Appendix B – Alaskan crude production (1977 – 2008) 
 
Dataset is based on EIA – 2. 
Data is given as million barrels annually. 
Year Production 
1977 164 
1978 449 
1979 512 
1980 591 
1981 592 
1982 627 
1983 665 
1984 638 
1985 667 
1986 670 
1987 718 
1988 749 
1989 683 
1990 652 
1991 656 
1992 625 
1993 579 
1994 571 
1995 540 
1996 510 
1997 473 
1998 437 
1999 388 
2000 328 
2001 355 
2002 361 
2003 357 
2004 334 
2005 312 
2006 242 
2007 261 
2008 248 
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Appendix C – Norwegian crude production (1971 - 2008) 
 
Dataset is based on BP Statistical Review (2009). 
Data is given as million tons annually. 
Year Production 
1971 0,3 
1972 1,6 
1973 1,6 
1974 1,7 
1975 9,2 
1976 13,7 
1977 14 
1978 17,4 
1979 19,5 
1980 25 
1981 24,3 
1982 25,2 
1983 31,4 
1984 36 
1985 39,2 
1986 43 
1987 50,1 
1988 57 
1989 74,9 
1990 82,1 
1991 93,8 
1992 106,9 
1993 114,1 
1994 128,6 
1995 138,4 
1996 154,7 
1997 156,2 
1998 149,6 
1999 149,7 
2000 160,2 
2001 162 
2002 157,3 
2003 153 
2004 149,9 
2005 138,2 
2006 128,7 
2007 118,8 
2008 114,2 
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Appendix D – United Kingdom crude production (1965 – 2008) 
 
Dataset is based on BP Statistical Review (2009). 
Data is given as million tons annually. 
Year Production   Year Production 
1965 0,1 
 
2003 106,1 
1966 0,1 
 
2004 95,4 
1967 0,1 
 
2005 84,7 
1968 0,1 
 
2006 76,6 
1969 0,1 
 
2007 76,8 
1970 0,2 
 
2008 72,2 
1971 0,2 
   1972 0,3 
   1973 0,4 
   1974 0,4 
   1975 1,6 
   1976 12,2 
   1977 38,3 
   1978 54,0 
   1979 77,9 
   1980 80,5 
   1981 89,5 
   1982 103,2 
   1983 115,0 
   1984 126,1 
   1985 127,6 
   1986 127,1 
   1987 123,4 
   1988 114,5 
   1989 91,7 
   1990 91,6 
   1991 91,3 
   1992 94,3 
   1993 100,2 
   1994 126,5 
   1995 129,9 
   1996 129,7 
   1997 127,9 
   1998 132,6 
   1999 137,4 
   2000 126,2 
   2001 116,7 
   2002 115,9 
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Appendix E – Crude oil prices (1861 – 2008) 
 
Dataset is based on BP Statistical Review (2009). 
Prices are given in US dollars. 
Year 
$ money  
of the day $ 2008 
 
Year 
$ money  
of the day $ 2008 
 
Year 
$ money  
of the day $ 2008 
 
Year 
$ money  
of the day $ 2008 
1861 0,5 11,8 
 
1898 0,9 23,6 
 
1935 1,0 15,3 
 
1972 2,5 12,8 
1862 1,1 22,7 
 
1899 1,3 33,5 
 
1936 1,1 17,0 
 
1973 3,3 16,0 
1863 3,2 55,3 
 
1900 1,2 30,9 
 
1937 1,2 17,8 
 
1974 11,6 50,8 
1864 8,1 111,5 
 
1901 1,0 24,9 
 
1938 1,1 17,4 
 
1975 11,5 46,3 
1865 6,6 93,1 
 
1902 0,8 20,0 
 
1939 1,0 15,9 
 
1976 12,8 48,6 
1866 3,7 55,2 
 
1903 0,9 22,6 
 
1940 1,0 15,7 
 
1977 13,9 49,6 
1867 2,4 37,2 
 
1904 0,9 20,7 
 
1941 1,1 16,8 
 
1978 14,0 46,5 
1868 3,6 58,9 
 
1905 0,6 14,9 
 
1942 1,2 15,8 
 
1979 31,6 94,1 
1869 3,6 59,1 
 
1906 0,7 17,5 
 
1943 1,2 15,0 
 
1980 36,8 96,6 
1870 3,9 66,0 
 
1907 0,7 16,7 
 
1944 1,2 14,9 
 
1981 35,9 85,4 
1871 4,3 78,3 
 
1908 0,7 17,3 
 
1945 1,1 12,6 
 
1982 33,0 73,8 
1872 3,6 65,7 
 
1909 0,7 16,8 
 
1946 1,1 12,4 
 
1983 29,6 64,1 
1873 1,8 33,0 
 
1910 0,6 14,1 
 
1947 1,9 18,4 
 
1984 28,8 58,3 
1874 1,2 22,4 
 
1911 0,6 14,1 
 
1948 2,0 17,9 
 
1985 27,6 55,2 
1875 1,4 26,6 
 
1912 0,7 16,6 
 
1949 1,8 16,2 
 
1986 14,4 28,3 
1876 2,6 52,0 
 
1913 1,0 20,8 
 
1950 1,7 15,4 
 
1987 18,4 34,9 
1877 2,4 49,1 
 
1914 0,8 17,5 
 
1951 1,7 14,2 
 
1988 14,9 27,2 
1878 1,2 26,7 
 
1915 0,6 13,7 
 
1952 1,7 13,9 
 
1989 18,2 31,6 
1879 0,9 19,9 
 
1916 1,1 21,8 
 
1953 1,9 15,6 
 
1990 23,7 39,3 
1880 1,0 21,3 
 
1917 1,6 26,4 
 
1954 1,9 15,5 
 
1991 20,0 31,7 
1881 0,9 19,2 
 
1918 2,0 28,5 
 
1955 1,9 15,6 
 
1992 19,3 29,7 
1882 0,8 17,5 
 
1919 2,0 25,2 
 
1956 1,9 15,4 
 
1993 17,0 25,5 
1883 1,0 23,2 
 
1920 3,1 33,2 
 
1957 1,9 14,6 
 
1994 15,8 23,2 
1884 0,8 20,2 
 
1921 1,7 21,0 
 
1958 2,1 15,6 
 
1995 17,0 24,3 
1885 0,9 21,1 
 
1922 1,6 20,8 
 
1959 2,1 15,4 
 
1996 20,7 28,6 
1886 0,7 17,1 
 
1923 1,3 17,0 
 
1960 1,9 13,9 
 
1997 19,1 25,9 
1887 0,7 16,1 
 
1924 1,4 18,1 
 
1961 1,8 13,0 
 
1998 12,7 17,3 
1888 0,9 21,1 
 
1925 1,7 20,8 
 
1962 1,8 12,9 
 
1999 18,0 23,6 
1889 0,9 22,6 
 
1926 1,9 23,0 
 
1963 1,8 12,7 
 
2000 28,5 36,2 
1890 0,9 20,9 
 
1927 1,3 16,2 
 
1964 1,8 12,5 
 
2001 24,4 30,1 
1891 0,7 16,1 
 
1928 1,2 14,8 
 
1965 1,8 12,3 
 
2002 25,0 30,2 
1892 0,6 13,5 
 
1929 1,3 16,1 
 
1966 1,8 12,0 
 
2003 28,8 33,7 
1893 0,6 15,4 
 
1930 1,2 15,4 
 
1967 1,8 11,7 
 
2004 38,3 43,6 
1894 0,8 21,0 
 
1931 0,7 9,3 
 
1968 1,8 11,2 
 
2005 54,5 60,1 
1895 1,4 35,3 
 
1932 0,9 13,8 
 
1969 1,8 10,6 
 
2006 65,1 69,6 
1896 1,2 30,6 
 
1933 0,7 11,2 
 
1970 1,8 10,0 
 
2007 72,4 75,1 
1897 0,8 20,5 
 
1934 1,0 16,2 
 
1971 2,2 12,0 
 
2008 97,3 97,3 
  
